











Title of Document: COMMUNICATING THROUGH VIOLENCE: 
AN APPLICATION OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY TO TERRORIST CLAIMS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY   
  
 Melissa Lynn Rorie, Master of Arts, 2008 
  
Directed By: Associate Professor Laura Dugan, Department of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice  
 
The present research applied rational choice theory to terrorists’ decisions to formally 
claim responsibility for an attack. Logistic regression is applied to United States’ 
incident characteristics, testing whether claim-making decreases over time and 
whether post-attack claims are less likely after incidents targeting specific entities. 
Variables being controlled for include the tactic used, whether the attack was 
successful, nationality of the target, and number of casualties. A sensitivity analysis 
of 100 randomly-selected cases examines measurement error in the dependent 
variable resulting from media attribution of group responsibility as opposed to formal 
claims from terrorists. Results indicate that striking a specific target does not decrease 
the likelihood that an attack will be formally claimed by a terrorist group. This 
research does provide evidence that influential factors in terrorist claim-making 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Background 
Perpetrators of most criminal offenses try to remain anonymous to avoid 
detection and arrest. In contrast, terrorism is often characterized by post-attack claims 
of responsibility in which the attackers justify their motives or threaten more 
violence. This aspect of terrorism that makes it unique has generally been ignored in 
prior research. The present study analyzes terrorist incidents occurring within the 
United States (U.S.) to examine how terrorists’ target choice (whether the general 
population versus a specific subpopulation) affects their decision to formally claim 
responsibility for the attack. 
Previous research has struggled to explain theoretically the way in which 
terrorists plan and execute attacks. Although previous research uses theory to explain 
victimization (e.g., Canetti-Nisim, Mesch, and Pedahzur, 2006; Lerner, Gonzales, 
Small, and Fischoff, 2003), structural causes of terrorism (e.g., Ross, 1993), or 
psychological and personality characteristics leading individuals into terrorist 
lifestyles (e.g., FRD, 1999; Vaisman-Tzachor, 2006) consistent theoretical support for 
terrorists’ strategic planning is hard to find.  
One promising avenue of research is the application of rational choice theory 
to terrorist attacks and planning. Rational choice theory states that offenders weigh 
the benefits, efforts, and risks associated with specific offenses when planning and 




literature has explained the deterrent effect of target hardening (e.g., Dugan, LaFree, 
and Piquero, 2005), the strategic logic in using particular tactics (Pape, 2003), and the 
costs and benefits associated with target choice (Clarke and Newman, 2006), but no 
previous literature has empirically investigated the rationale behind public claims of 
responsibility. Doing so may help researchers and policymakers understand and 
reduce the appeal of terrorism as a means of obtaining publicity (Schmid, 1989).  
Before exploring terrorists’ decisions to claim attacks, it is important to first 
define what a terrorist attack is. Government agencies, terrorism researchers, and 
media outlets use different terms and criteria to identify terrorism. Definitions of 
terrorism are plentiful and are guided by the interests of the organization working 
with the information at hand. Existing data sources often use narrow definitions of 
terrorism and may include, for example, only politically-motivated attacks. In doing 
so, terrorist attacks motivated by religious or social goals are neglected. Furthermore, 
many publicly available databases exclude domestic terrorism, although it is more 
prevalent than international incidents (LaFree and Dugan, 2007).  
The use of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the University of 
Maryland’s Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Center 
addresses such limitations, as data are collected using a more inclusive definition of 
terrorism than those used by other open-source databases. The GTD uses media and 
government documents to obtain information on domestic as well as international 
terrorist events around the world since 1970 (the present research only uses data on 
incidents within the U.S.). For every incident included, the GTD contains specifics on 




casualties, and the group/individual responsible (when identified; LaFree and Dugan, 
2007). For the purposes of the present study, terrorism incidents are those involving 
“the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, 
economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree, 
Dugan, Fogg, and Scott, 2006, p. 21).  
To best achieve such goals, a successful attack is one that the target audience 
sees and understands the reason for its occurrence. People use violence as a means of 
communication, dominance, and control; of particular relevance to the present study 
is how individuals communicate through violent acts. Katz (1988) noted that 
individuals turn to physical violence when verbal assaults are not adequate for 
conveying a particular message; they use violence to “go beneath the surface of the 
everyday persona.” (p. 38) When a violent act is truly terrible, it induces fear and is 
often immortalized through myths shared thereafter (Katz, 1988). Violence has a 
meaning for those who commit it as well as for those who experience it, which begs 
scholars to understand the way in which individuals use violence to fulfill needs. 
Violence itself is not the goal of the terrorists’ actions; the violence used is 
less important than the political or cultural response to the violence (Garrison, 2003; 
Kenney, 1995). Instrumental violence is committed to achieve an explicit goal while 
expressive violence is an unplanned act of anger, rage, or frustration (Meithe and 
Drass, 1999). Terrorism is implicitly an example of instrumental violence, as the act 
requires planning and has a clear purpose (Garrison, 2003). To achieve the 
aforementioned goals, Nacos (2002) argues that terrorists communicate through 




through formal communiqués) because they have no opportunity to reach the public 
through mainstream media—unless they do something dramatic to garner attention.  
Just as violence serves as a means of communication for terrorists, gangs and 
organized crime syndicates use symbolism in their violent acts to convey messages. 
This paper draws upon gang and organized crime literature to illuminate how terrorist 
groups use symbolic violence (with targets as the symbol) to affect others. Gangs and 
organized crime syndicates are similar to terrorists in their use of violence, the 
diversity of organizational structures, and often group-specific ethnicity (Fagan, 
1989; Kenney, 1995).  Indeed, the literature notes that some terrorist groups morph 
into organized criminals or gangs, or vice versa (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Kenney, 
1995). For example, Blazak (2001) provides an informative study on how informal 
youth hate groups in America are indoctrinated into skinhead terrorist organizations. 
Katz’s (1988) “badasses” and terrorists both attempt to make their attacks 
unpredictable, thereby making all social situations ominous. Badasses do this to 
maintain their reputation of toughness while terrorists do this to affect the behavior of 
the public, in turn influencing the behavior of the government (Garrison, 2003; Katz, 
1988). Targeting innocent civilians makes terrorists’ actions seem unpredictable and 
maximizes the psychological effect of the attack (Cronin, 2002). When the public 
fears terrorism (despite low actual probability of an attack) there are large social 
costs, as when the economy suffers due to public reluctance to travel. The 
government must respond quickly to terrorist attacks to allay fears and prevent 




The symbolism of the clothing, language, and violence of gangs parallels 
terrorist use of symbolic targets (Kenney, 1995); the different media by which these 
organizations communicate is driven by the simple fact that gang members operating 
in the United States are generally visible (Katz, 1988; Sobel and Osaba, 2006) while 
terrorists generally conceal their group membership.  Although acts of violence 
committed by gang members do receive media attention, some argue that the most 
defining aspect of street gangs is the symbolism employed; rituals and images create 
a sense of collective identity. In the absence of violence and criminal acts, the gang 
would not be labeled as such, thus symbolic images and rituals are necessary to 
maintain cohesion when not engaging in criminal actions (Katz and Jackson-Jacobs, 
2004; Kenney, 1995). Gang leaders often encourage delinquent acts in order to 
sustain group cohesion, and gangs use symbolic violence (e.g., policing strangers, 
protecting residents) to claim territories and create symbolic maps of their 
neighborhoods (Fagan, 1989; Venkatesh, 1997).  
Similarly, terrorist groups often require potential members to commit illegal 
acts as part of the group initiation, which increases investment in the group and 
makes it difficult to leave. Individual members derive satisfaction in contributing to a 
meaningful purpose through violence (Crenshaw, 1987). Terrorists further create 
cohesion through the common ideology that drives the planning of attacks and 
crimes; specific strategies symbolize the collective goals of the group (Crenshaw, 
1987). Altheide (1987) notes that victims of terrorist attacks are merely “vehicles for 
making a point, establishing a symbolic victory, or asserting an identity as a viable 




Rational Choice Theory and Terrorism 
Rational Choice Theory 
Rational Choice Theory stems from economics and argues that people act to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs. Related to criminal behavior, offenders seek 
to benefit themselves and weigh the “choice-structuring properties” of alternative 
actions (Cornish and Clarke, 1987, p. 935). After considering the skills required, 
potential benefits, and costs/risks, offenders make decisions to engage in a criminal 
act (or not) and the methods to employ. Cornish and Clarke argue that to understand 
and prevent crimes, one should look at the motives, opportunities, rewards, and costs 
offered by various activities. Importantly, choice-structuring properties not only 
provide information about the crime but also tell us about the offender (e.g., his/her 
needs, preferences, personal characteristics, and perceptions). Understanding how 
terrorist opportunities are driven by terrorist motivations and are exploited will enable 
law enforcement and policymakers to manipulate situations to increase risk, increase 
difficulty, and decrease rewards (Clarke and Newman, 2006). 
When applying rational choice theory to terrorism, it is important to consider 
the goals of the perpetrators because these goals guide strategic decisions. The 
individual or organization may be using violence to create a climate of fear, create 
media sensation, or humiliate officials and government (see Clarke and Newman, 
2006, p. 24 for a more comprehensive list). Not only do terrorists choose violence 
from many alternatives, they also engage in a deliberate planning process that 
involves many decision points to maximize the benefits from the assault. One must 




prevent attacks (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Cornish and Clarke, 1987; Ross and 
Gurr, 1989). Examining terrorists’ claim-making decisions will clarify whether they 
engage in a rational calculus both during and after the attack.  
Although much of the literature considering terrorism in terms of rational 
choice focuses on public policies’ deterrent effect on terrorism (for example, see 
Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero, 2005), one should consider the choice of targets and its 
effect on media manipulation as an exercise in rational decision-making as well. As 
Guerette, Stenius, and McGloin (2005) point out, “Rather than randomly and 
aimlessly carrying out a crime, individuals select targets to fulfill their respective 
needs in response to individual motivations. Contextual and situational factors… 
heavily influence the criminal event decision.” (p.80)  
Literature implies that terrorist groups convey messages through the strategies 
employed in their attacks, either explicitly through communiqués or implicitly 
through decisions such as their choice of victims. Targeting the general population 
may send an ambiguous message that necessitates the terrorists identifying 
themselves post-attack and clarifying motivations via statements in the media. 
However, when victims are highly specific and symbolic, there is less need to 
formally announce involvement in an attack. By choosing a particular target, 
terrorists manipulate the costs and benefits of communicating with the media. 
 
 
Benefits of Claiming an Attack 
 
Katz (1988) argues that those using violence in a public setting are acting not 




of them. Gangs often “parade” (walking in unison past a public audience while 
displaying gang colors/insignia) as a means of shocking the public and forcing their 
values onto a public scene (Katz, 1988; Katz and Jackson-Jacobs, 2004). As Katz 
(1988, p. 144) writes, “Parading… is seductive as a way of injecting self-confident 
expressions into the consciousness of a mass of observers. It follows that the mass 
media’s coverage of ‘gang activities’ is a powerful stimulus to members’ 
involvement.” Public displays of violence benefit individuals in the gang, as such 
exhibits communicate the ruthlessness of the gang and its members. By advertising 
membership in a gang, an individual may be protected against violence; anyone who 
considers brutalizing them sees the threat of gang retaliation (Katz and Jackson-
Jacobs, 2004; Sobel and Osoba, 2006). 
For terrorists in the U.S., the media makes the attack public, affects the 
perceptions of society, and enables the individual or organizations to justify their 
actions as well as call attention to their causes (Nacos, 2002; Picard, 1993). The main 
benefit of formally claiming responsibility of a terrorist attack is increased publicity, 
as media outlets are more likely to report on attacks in which responsibility is known 
(Weimann and Winn, 1994)
1
. Through publicity, terrorist groups spread fear and 
stress in the public, increase the likelihood that others will imitate attacks, and convey 
political/religious motives. Mass media exposure magnifies the importance of the 
event; terrorists stage the event (when and where it will take place) to maximize 
                                                 
1
 Weimann and Winn (1994) found that for ten out of twelve newspapers studied, known or claimed 
responsibility for a terrorist event had a significant correlation (r=0.22) with newspaper reporting 





shock value (Clarke and Newman, 2006). By publicly announcing responsibility, they 
are feared and thus earn attention due to the threat they pose (Picard, 1993).  
Terrorists also use formal claims of responsibility to justify their actions, 
which parallels what has been observed in organized crime. Scholars note that gangs 
and organized crime syndicates disseminate information to earn goodwill from their 
community (e.g., Sicilian Mafiosi argue that force is necessary for the benefit of the 
group; Skaperdas, 2001) or provide public services to their neighborhood (Venkatesh, 
1997). Skaperdas (2001, p. 186) wrote that “… the outward projection of the 
provider-of-public-good image is often an important, if not necessary, component of 
organizations that have matured enough to compete with the state itself.” Similarly, 
the terrorist group must show that violence was used in the name of the common 
good. The more violent the act, the more the terrorists have to explain and justify it—
they often compare it to being in a state of war (Clarke and Newman, 2006).   
The Italian mafia justified involvement in illegal activities as a means of 
succeeding in a society that denied them access to legitimate political and economic 
opportunities (Lupsha, 1981). Likewise, by describing real needs and justifying 
objectives that necessitate violence, terrorists attempt to convince potential supporters 
in the public of their moral legitimacy (Smilansky, 2004). Ross (1993) notes that 
terrorism relies on the communication of grievances through the media to disgruntled 
populations, who will then be motivated and inspired to action. Terrorists cannot exist 
without broader sources of active or passive sympathy, resources and support 
(Cronin, 2002). Recruitment and funding are essential to maintain the terrorist 




terrorist group (United States Institute for Peace [USIP], 1999). To the extent to 
which terrorist groups can obtain public support, they will be more successful.  
 
Costs of Claiming an Attack 
There are costs associated with publicizing one’s involvement that must be 
weighed against the benefits.  Publicity garnered by a terrorist attack may backfire 
due to the “event-oriented” nature of media in the United States; although terrorists 
are likely to receive media attention, this does not automatically confer legitimacy. 
Unlike legislators (who have large media relations department and are able to make 
clear decisions about how to act and what to say in public), terrorist relations with the 
media are furtive and they are less able to refine communications (Altheide, 1987; 
Clarke and Newman, 2006). The tactics and aftermath of terrorist attacks are likely to 
be reported by the mass media, but the social conditions precipitating the attacks are 
not (Altheide, 1987).  
The death of citizens and resulting chaos encourage governments to deny the 
legitimacy of the organization’s specific grievances. Policymakers are able to focus 
on punishing the terrorist act itself without publicizing the underlying issues 
(Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Picard, 1993). The governing agency instead 
argues that the group is trying to destroy a way of life and, therefore, it is futile to 
negotiate (Abrahms, 2006). When the message is communicated inaccurately, the 
terrorist group may risk losing the support of its constituency (USIP, 1999). Public 
awareness campaigns that condemn the use of terrorist violence have been shown to 




supporters of terrorism in the population (Funes, 1998). Without public support, 
claiming an attack may evoke outrage towards terrorists if they continue to use 
violence when their audience opposes it (Ross and Gurr, 1989).  
Claiming an attack also removes the potential for anonymity and makes the 
group vulnerable to counterterrorism measures (e.g., military actions and economic 
sanctions for state sponsors; Hoffman, 1996; Jenkins, 2001; Rapoport, 1997). 
Globalization makes it easier for a terrorist to travel undetected, increasing the 
difficulty to trace a terrorist attack to its source and further decreasing incentives to 
publicize involvement (Cronin, 2002). This desire for anonymity is contrasted by the 
organized crime literature that notes logos or gang colors are displayed by members 
to communicate the threat of retaliation by the gang. Gang members proclaim their 
membership loudly as a means of protection from violence (Sobel and Osoba, 2006), 
while terrorists may choose anonymity to protect themselves.  
 The decision to claim an attack therefore involves rational calculus on the part 
of terrorists, a calculus in which certain variables play a particularly important role. 
The present research examines the influence of the type of target (whether a specific 
target or the general population) as well as the reduction in claim-making over time 
resulting from changes in risk and other factors.   
 
Communicating Through Choice of Targets 
Katz (1988) discusses symbols used to implicitly communicate a criminal 
message; gangs or delinquent groups are collective movements that use their style 




invulnerability, alienation, and their superiority to conventional moral appeals. These 
physical symbols of the “badass” communicate a warning of danger that is ominous 
because it is automatic, intimating that the individual will not waste time rationalizing 
about the use of violence. On the other hand, terrorists are not visible and therefore 
use their acts of violence as symbols. Although the terrorists themselves are not 
visible, the terrorist act is public because society must see and react to the attack. 
When choosing a target, it is important for the terrorists to consider its iconic value 
(i.e., the target’s symbolic value to society; Clarke and Newman, 2006).  
Using the Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan, 2007), I examine 
whether the choice of target (specific targets or the general population) is related to 
formal claims of responsibility. The terms “general public” and “specific target” have 
not been operationalized in previous research. In this research, I applied a set of 
criteria pertaining to a variety of contextual factors to determine whether the target 
was the general public or a specific entity (described in the methods section). 
Meanwhile, when discussing targets, the term public refers to a location shared by 
people regardless of demographic characteristics (e.g., a tourist attraction). Specific 
targets are those locations occupied by or serving a population that shares a common 
demographic characteristic (e.g., a homosexual nightclub). 
Different forms of terrorism (e.g., hijackings, suicide bombs) have different 
objectives, and the terrorist group must consider the opportunities before them, the 
resources they have available, and the desired goal (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Pape, 
2003).Though terrorism has the appearance of being indiscriminate, targets are 




1989). Schmid (1983) argues that terrorism is aimed at individuals in order to 
promote fear in other members of the population; the target is less important than the 
reaction of society. As with Katz’s (1988) cold-blooded murders, the targeting of 
innocent victims is important to evoke dread among the public. Though targets are 
not random, the victims often seem to be, which causes public anxiety, fear, and 
behavioral changes (Garrison, 2003). With chaos ensuing after a terrorist attack, 
governmental leaders of the population are encouraged to satisfy the demands of the 
terrorists or draw attention to the terrorists’ cause (Ross, 1993; Sunstein, 2003).  
 
General vs. Specific Targets 
When planning an attack, the group must anticipate the process by which the 
audience defines, interprets, and understands the symbolism of the attack (Altheide, 
1987). The legitimacy of the target heavily influences public perceptions and affects 
whether the group needs to justify their actions after the attack. The general 
population is less likely to be seen as a “legitimate” target and will lead to more anger 
towards the terrorist group, compelling the group to issue a public message (Hoffman, 
1999; Picard, 1993).  
It is important that the terrorists’ message be clear when targeting the public 
for two reasons: 1) the terrorists are more explicitly trying to communicate with the 
government by attacking the people to which the government is accountable, and 2) 
the group or individual responsible may be trying to gain support from non-victims 




1987, Hoffman, 1996). Without an accompanying statement of policy objectives the 
terrorists’ intentions are more easily misconstrued and discredited (Abrahms, 2006). 
Some terrorists choose to attack specific targets that have intrinsic value to a 
particular population the terrorist is trying to provoke; for example, left-wing groups 
often attack elite targets symbolizing authority (Cronin, 2002).  Garrison (2003, p. 43) 
writes, “Terrorism does not seek specific victims, but it does seek specific targets for 
a specific outcome.” Katz (1988) notes the importance of choosing victims; the 
“badass” more efficiently proves his mean spirit by targeting vulnerable victims in 
respectable places (e.g., elderly library patrons). In the same manner, by attacking 
highly symbolic and specific targets, terrorists are able to adjust the costs and benefits 
of the attack in its entirety—including the decision to claim responsibility. 
When the costs of formally claiming an attack outweighs the benefits, groups 
may let the symbolism of the attack speak for it, known as “propaganda by deed” 
(Garrison, 2003, p. 45; Gearson, 2002).  The terrorist group can instill fear in a target 
audience (a benefit) by attacking symbolic members of that population. If the target is 
symbolic enough, the message meant to be conveyed by the group is unambiguous 
and precludes the need to formally claim responsibility (Rapoport, 1997). Benefits are 
thus realized without additional effort, and the terrorists avoid manipulation of their 
message as well as potential counterterrorism measures. When terrorists choose to 
target a specific organization or individual, I expect that they will be less likely to 






Change in Targets and Claims over Time 
Another way to apply rational choice theory to terrorists’ decisions is by 
examining changes over time; it is likely that the benefits and costs of claiming an 
attack vary. According to Hoffman (1996, 1997, 1999), unclaimed attacks in the U.S. 
have become more prominent over time with increased counterterrorism measures 
(e.g., economic sanctions against state sponsors, increased funding for U.S. agencies) 
and changes in terrorist group agendas. Terrorism by religiously-motivated groups 
and amateurs
2
 has increased over time. Religious groups do not feel they need to 
justify the attack (because their legitimacy comes from religious doctrine) while 
amateurs often do not have a clear rationale that can be easily communicated.  
Few empirical studies have examined the change in U.S. terrorism over time, 
though previous literature implies that there are noteworthy differences across 
decades. Scholars such as Enders and Sandler (2000), Garrison (2003), Hoffman 
(1999) and Jenkins (2001) argue that in the 1960s and 1970s, Middle-Eastern-based 
terrorism in the U.S. was geared at gaining publicity for a cause. In the 1980s, attacks 
were often followed by credit-taking or by warning about future attacks if there was 
no change in U.S. policies. In the 1990s, attacks were claimed less often. Terrorists 
also increased the casualty count over time to maximize not only media attention but 
also public anxiety (Enders and Sandler, 2003; Hoffman, 1997).  
However, Martha Crenshaw (2000, 2006) contends that the evidence 
suggesting a “new” terrorism is weak, and that the perception of changing 
                                                 
2
 Enders and Sandler (2000) and Hoffman (1997) characterize amateur terrorists as being less 
disciplined, lacking leadership, and less structured than radical or state-sponsored groups. These 





motivations and tactics over time may be driven by events occurring within a short 
period of time (but not necessarily linked by causal factors). She argues that even 
with the seeming (though not proven) increases in religious terrorism, contemporary 
groups differ in terms of organizational structure, social rootedness, and tactics.  
If terrorists are engaging in rational decisions, it seems reasonable that 
increasing emphasis on counterterrorism and changes in terrorist motivations as 
described above would decrease the perceived benefits of claiming attacks over time. 




Purpose of the Present Research    
All violent terrorist acts involve publicity in some form, even without formal 
claims. The Shining Path in Peru, for example, avoided the media, but their acts were 
so violent they encouraged publicity through word of mouth (Clarke and Newman, 
2006). Terrorist organizations are aware that they will be the primary suspects if the 
target is specific enough; news organizations will likely report on them and their 
cause without the risk of an explicit claim of responsibility (Nacos, 2002).  
It is common for targets of violence to be a direct or symbolic source of 
perceived injustice (Katz, 1988). Here, audiences understand the symbolism of a 
specific target, and the intended benefit is realized (Nacos, 2002; Smilansky, 2004).  
This process is facilitated in contemporary times by the internet, which empowers 




distant groups (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Overall, the literature suggests that 
making a post-attack claim is less important (or is more costly) for contemporary 
terrorist groups, no matter who they target.   
Previous literature discusses formal claims for terrorist attacks in terms of the 
larger context of planning and emphasizes why terrorists issue manifestoes and 
communiqués after attacks. The choice not to communicate with the media is not 
generally discussed as a deliberate choice of terrorists
3
 and tends to be examined 
cursorily in the context of other situational variables (e.g., FRD, 1999 and 
ideological/religious perceptions of terrorists; Hoffman, 1999 and support from local 
populations; Pape, 2003 and suicide terrorism). Further, this topic has not been 
subjected to empirical analyses. It is discussed in theoretical terms that assume 
differences exist between claimed and unclaimed attacks, but not quantified or tested.  
There is more empirical research on the factors motivating the choice of 
targets by terrorists, but previous literature has not linked this to post-attack 
communication. Nor has previous research more generally associated decision-
making by the terrorist group during attack planning to post-attack claims. This study 
explores the differences between claimed and anonymous attacks and lays out 
potential issues for future research into how terrorist claim-making is influenced by 
earlier stages of attack planning.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 An exception to this is Hoffman (1996, 1997, 1999), who argues that terrorists are less likely to claim 





This thesis investigates whether terrorists engage in a rational calculus in deciding 
to formally claim responsibility after an attack, which is affected by the choice of 
target (specific targets or the general population). Terrorist groups seek to advertise a 
particular message, but targeting specific entity is unambiguous and does not 
necessitate clarification through a formal message post-attack.  Further, changes in 
counterterrorism efforts and terrorist agendas may affect the decision to claim attacks 
over time. Therefore, I propose two hypotheses:  
 
1. When terrorists attack a specific population (i.e., members sharing a common 
characteristic) they are less likely to claim the attack because there are no 
additional benefits realized in doing so.  
 
2. Independent of target choice, the decisions to claim attacks will decrease over 





Chapter 2: Methods 
 
Attribution versus Formal Claims 
I use data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) spanning the 
years 1970 – 1997. The GTD is housed at the University of Maryland’s Center for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). As previously noted, for 
every incident included the GTD contains information about the date, location, 
weapons used, the target, number of casualties, and (when identified) the 
group/individual responsible (LaFree and Dugan, 2007).This database is particularly 
advantageous to this research, as it is comprised of events reported by the media and 
thus has the capacity to measure extremists’ use of publicity directly. This is better 
than using data that do not include media sources (e.g., court data or law enforcement 
records) because it allows for better inferences about the link between terrorist attacks 
and media coverage. 
However, it is possible that the media attributes a terrorist attack to a 
particular group without a formal claim, making it unclear if incidents were coded as 
claimed in the GTD because groups were actually communicating with the media. To 
investigate this, I drew a random sample of 100 cases from the original database and 
recoded its claimed status. I used academic databases containing historic newspapers 
(e.g., LexisNexis, Proquest) to find the original source of the data, as well as 
supplemental media coverage of the incident to compile an accurate description of the 




source being unavailable (e.g., it was only mentioned in small local newspapers or the 
source is out of print). In such cases, the incident was dropped and a new one was 
randomly selected to replace it. The resulting database only contains incidents 
occurring in 1977 and beyond, a bias that will be addressed in the analysis.   
I used this information to determine how often attacks were coded as claimed 
in the GTD when in fact the media assigned responsibility to a particular group based 
on other factors. This provides a test of whether I can use media attribution as a proxy 
for whether an incident is claimed. I also compared my analyses on the larger dataset 
to the same models run on the smaller dataset to determine if results differ.  
This detailed examination of a sample of cases also provides an opportunity to 
describe the difference between claimed and unclaimed attacks, which has not been 
extensively analyzed in the literature. The in-depth look at the sample of 100 enables 
us to understand better the context in which groups claim an attack. To this end, 
Chapter 3 includes a description of differences between claimed and unclaimed 
attacks such as tactics used, weapons used, decisions made by the terrorists earlier in 
the process, and media responses. I also collected data on arrests and other post-attack 
consequences in hopes of assessing cost and benefits of claiming attacks. 
 
 
Use of Existing Data Source 
This research only examines incidents that occurred in the United States. This 
includes both domestic and transnational attacks within U.S. borders but does not 




anger among insurgents who view American policies as perpetrating economic 
inequality and exploitation in the U.S. and abroad (Vaisman-Tzachor, 2006). U.S. 
nationals have most consistently been targets of terrorists since 1968 (Cronin, 2002). 
In addition to domestic groups (e.g., anti-abortion terrorists and right-wing 
separatists), the U.S.’s engagement in international politics and its allies make it 
susceptible to attacks by parties from all over the world (Crenshaw, 2001). The 
variety of motives is beneficial in exploring terrorist decision-making.  
Another advantage of using incidents occurring in the U.S. is demonstrated 
when considering the ability of U.S. law enforcement to track terrorists overseas. 
Terrorists are less likely to be brought to justice in those cases, as the U.S. is not 
generally successful in capturing terrorists abroad (Sandler, 2003). By using U.S. data 
I am in a better position to assess law enforcement influences on rational decisions.  
However, to the extent that issues promoting terrorism in the U.S. are unique, 
external validity will be limited. While it may be that similar models will produce 
similar results in other Western democracies, it is likely that terrorism in the U.S. is 
truly unique and these results could not be replicated. This does not mean the analysis 
does not have value; researchers should look at the present research as a starting point 
from which to expand the literature on terrorist manipulation of the media.  
 
Advantages and Limitations of the GTD 
The GTD is the best available database from which to gather data because of 
its breadth; it is approximately seven times larger than other datasets from the same 




transnational terrorism in the U.S. (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). This information 
comes from a variety of open sources, including wire services (e.g., Reuters), U.S. 
State Department reports, other U.S. and government reports, and U.S. and foreign 
newspapers, among others. Another advantage of the GTD is the consistency of the 
data collection effort; only two different managers oversaw data collection efforts 
from 1970 to 1997. The stability of oversight and related policies likely contributed to 
the reliability of information contained in the GTD (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). 
 The GTD is not without its limitations, which include those common to most 
open-source terrorism databases (such as International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events [ITERATE] or the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism [MIPT] and RAND’s terrorism data). All rely on news sources and are 
therefore biased towards more sensational forms of terrorism. It is also important to 
note the problems in identifying anonymous attacks as terrorism, as media sources are 
often unable to identify the perpetrators (and motives) of violent attacks, making it 
difficult to discern between acts of crime and terrorism (LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, and 
Scott, 2006). This has special implications for the research at hand; if anonymous 
attacks are not accurately identified as terrorism, then the database may be biased 
disproportionately to include operations that are claimed.  
It is important here to realize that the GTD uses a broad definition of terrorism 
for inclusion, which may mediate the bias towards claimed attacks. Again, the 
definition used is “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by 
nonstate actors to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, 




definition encompasses aspects of terrorism that many other databases ignore; namely 
threats of violence, economic and religious objectives, and domestic incidents. The 
original data collector was a private organization providing risk assessments to 
corporate clients who were concerned about risks from any terrorist actions regardless 
of political or religious motivation, civilians or government victims, or claimed or 
unclaimed attacks. The organization felt inclusiveness would benefit their clients. 
Therefore, anonymous events that are missed by other databases may be more likely 
to be picked up for entry into the GTD (LaFree et al., 2006).  
A limitation unique to the GTD involves the loss of all 1993 data during an 
office move prior to START’s possession. Much of the 1993 data was re-created, but 
START has been unable to obtain the full number of terrorist attacks that PGIS 
documented. To be more specific, the re-creation yielded 1,100 cases as opposed to 
the original 4,954 from PGIS. The problem arises from the inability to retrospectively 
retrieve sources, such as local newspapers in foreign countries, given the resources 
available. Since I am using the U.S. subset of the data, this limitation is less 
problematic for my analyses than if I were analyzing international data. According to 
a PGIS annual report, there were 28 incidents in the United States in 1993. The re-
created data retrieved 20 incidents, or about 71 percent. In conclusion, though it is not 
perfect, the GTD is clearly better equipped than other databases to study the research 








The current database consists of 1,087 unique terrorist operations in the 
United States between 1970 and 1997, which may contain multiple incidents (e.g., a 
bombing campaign may result in bombs placed in multiple locations)
4
. These 
operations include those attacks indirectly furthering the objectives of the terrorist 
organizations (e.g., armored car robberies to obtain funds) as well as those operations 
staged for the explicit purpose of communicating the group’s objectives. Since my 
theory focuses on extremists’ attempts to use the media after attacks to directly 
further their cause, I dropped activities such as robberies (n = 12), reducing the 
sample to 1,075 operations. 
I also dropped cases from the National Abortion Federation’s (NAF) website 
because the origin of information contained in the website is not known and may not 
be from open sources. Cases of abortion clinic violence from other sources were kept 
in the data, as collection of this data was consistent with GTD source allocation. 
Dropping the cases from NAF’s website resulted in the exclusion of 200 operations, 
bringing my sample to 875 operations.  
Some terrorist incidents were claimed by multiple groups, which creates 
ambiguity in the analysis should such cases be included. When groups claim attacks 
for which they are not responsible, they are clearly not influenced by the population 
targeted and thus the model does not apply. Seven operations involving more than 
one claim were dropped from the analysis, bringing the sample size to 868 operations.  
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 Although operations contain multiple incidents, the incidents are identical (e.g., three car bombings) 





Lastly, upon recoding the types of targets, I discovered 14 operations in which 
the target name was coded as missing or unknown. Given the importance of this 
variable for the analysis at hand, those cases were dropped. This brought my final 
sample size to 854 attacks.  
 
 
Theoretical and Operational Definitions of Concepts 
Formal Claim for Attack  
The dependent variable is whether attacks were followed by claims of 
responsibility. In the GTD, this is represented using a dummy variable (1 = claimed, 0 
= not claimed). This variable was created under the assumption that if the media 
source contains a specific group’s name that the attack was claimed. If the group 
name listed in the database was a generic name (e.g., “anti-abortionist”) or was 
missing then the attack was not considered to be claimed.  
In the random sample of 100 cases, claim of responsibility was again 
represented using a dummy variable (1 = claimed, 0 = not claimed). However, in 
these cases, the incident was not coded as claimed unless the article explicitly stated 
that terrorists made post-attack contact with the media. For example, in news stories 
describing two abortion clinic attacks in Atlanta, Georgia, a statement read “The FBI 
will make a public appeal for help today by releasing copies of letters claiming 





Type of Target 
 My main interest lies in the relationship between whether attacks are claimed 
and whether the target is the general public or a specific target (e.g., a business or 
religious leader). In both databases, the independent variable is measured by one 
binary variable representing whether the target was the general population or a 
specific target (1 = specific, 0 = general). In reviewing the specific descriptions of the 
targets, I noted that there was much ambiguity in the original coding. To better 
disentangle whether the attack truly targeted the general population or a specific 
target, I used outside resources (e.g., Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism’s [MIPT] Terrorism Knowledge Base [TKB], Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s annual reports Terrorism in the United States, globalsecurity.org, 
websites of the businesses or buildings targeted) to gain a better understanding about 
every incident’s target in the database.  
It is important to note that retroactively coding targets based on outside 
sources introduces potential bias to the analyses. If these sources did not include 
smaller (less damaging) attacks or attacks against less popular targets, I had less 
information to guide target coding. Should there be an imbalance in how I correctly 
coded targets based on the scale of the incidents, this may affect my results to the 
extent that smaller incident targets drive the decision to claim or not claim such 
incidents. For example, suppose I miscode a small-scale claimed public attack as 
targeting a specific target. If terrorists are more inclined to provide justification after 
attacking the general public, my incorrect coding would erroneously imply an 




resources (e.g., government reports, business websites) should lessen the potential for 
bias, but it is important to consider.   
Using all available information, I went through the 854 incidents in my database 
and hand-entered the appropriate target code.  When deciding how to recode the true 
target population of an attack most accurately I used a variety of contextual 
conditions, as described in the following criteria: 
- Who the attack was intended to hurt the most: I determined the name of the 
target or location by looking at the target description in the GTD and conducted 
research on the site to identify the population served. If the target was frequented 
by (or served) a diverse population (e.g., a nightclub, the post office), then it was 
coded as a general population target. If the target was chosen because the people 
frequenting it were of a particular demographic (e.g., a homosexual nightclub, a 
bar with black patrons) then I recoded that as a specific population target. If the 
target was a foreign business, agency, or individual (e.g., a foreign airline, 
embassy, or ambassador), it implied service provision to a specific population and 
was generally coded as a specific target. 
- Tactic: If the intended population remained ambiguous, I considered the tactic as 
an indicator of the true target. For example, an attack involving a bomb implies 
intent to injure a large number of people because bombs maximize damage and 
the terrorists are not able to control who is in the general location. Therefore, if a 
store was targeted with an explosive and no other indication was given that the 
company was a specific target (e.g., from the incident description), that particular 




- Banks: Many times, banks were targeted for the purpose of robbing them to 
obtain money. There is a variable in the database that denotes whether the attack 
was actually a robbery; if this was the case, these attacks were dropped as they do 
not directly serve to promulgate terrorist ideology.  Otherwise, the tactic 
determined classification. If a bomb was planted at a bank, this suggests that the 
general population was targeted. Facility attacks, on the other hand, indicate that 
the terrorists were present at the time of the attack (e.g., in a hostage situation or 
hijacking). If the tactic listed was an attack on a facility, then I coded it as a 
specific target because the terrorists were in control over who was targeted by the 
weapon used.   
- Government target: Targeting the general population is thought to undermine 
the public’s belief in the government’s ability to protect them (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006; Sandler, 2003). Terrorists may be able to do this more directly by 
targeting government figures and property. Though many would consider 
government targets to be highly symbolic (Altheide, 1987), their widespread 
allure as targets for terrorism makes the act itself ambiguous; the audience cannot 
infer a group-specific message from the attack itself. Thus, most attacks on well-
known government entities (e.g., that are likely to draw tourists or serve as a 
gathering place for the public) were coded as general public targets. Conversely, 
some government agencies are not easily identifiable (e.g., are in a nondescript 
office building) and are not likely to be populated by the general public. If the 




division) or if the act seemed to be an act of retaliation (given the description of 
the incident), then such incidents were coded as specific targets.  
 
Time 
It has been noted in the literature that terrorist groups have increasingly 
remained silent after committing an act of terrorism in recent decades (Hoffman 
1996, 1997, 1999). This may be due to the increased emphasis on counterterrorism 
strategies, changes in overall motivations for terrorism, learning from previous 
experiences, or learning from the examples of other terrorist groups. I examine time 
as a categorical variable as well as a continuous variable to see how its effect differs 
as a function of assuming a linear relationship with claim-making.    
 
Control Variables 
When engaging in exploratory research such as this, it is important to control 
for variables that may mediate the relationship between the main variables of interest. 
By partialling out variance from potentially confounding sources, I can be more 
confident in type of target’s influence on claim-making. All control variables are 
coded the same way in the large GTD and small 100-case database. 
First, it is necessary to account for the tactic used in the incident: whether the 
attack was a bombing, facility attack (meaning that the terrorists were present during 
the attack as in a hostage situation), or other type (including assassinations, 




signature methods of committing terrorism that may be unique enough to circumvent 
the necessity of a public claim for the attack. At the same time, the tactic may change 
according to the appropriateness for the population targeted (e.g., bombings may be 
more useful for attacks against the general public whereas assassinations may be 
more useful for specific targets).   
Whether the attack was successful likely influences the perceived benefits of 
the attack and in turn may affect whether an attack is claimed, regardless of the type 
of target (Ross and Gurr, 1989). Conversely, the target may determine whether the 
attack was successful (e.g., private businesses may have more security). This is coded 
as a dummy variable, with a value of “1” indicating that the attack was successful.  
Another perception of benefits gleaned from the attack may be related to the 
amount of injuries or deaths, controlled for using a count variable summing the 
number of wounded and killed. In its original form, this variable has a few outliers 
and ranges from 1 to 1006.  I used the natural log of this variable to reduce the effect 
of the outliers. 
Although the data describes terrorist operations on U.S. soil, targets include 
both U.S. and foreign nationals. The nationality of target choice may be relevant in 
determining whether an attack is claimed or not, given different motives of terrorist 
groups originating from different countries that may operate in the U.S. The 






Before running the formal analyses, it is important to understand how 
unclaimed attacks differ from those claimed. Obtaining the data on the subset of 100 
cases provided the opportunity to investigate these differences in depth. To this end, I 
will run t-tests on those attacks that were claimed versus those that were unclaimed to 
determine if means differed significantly between the two types of attacks. I will also 
use t-tests and ANOVAs to ascertain whether those attacks in which claim status was 
incorrectly coded are more similar to claimed or unclaimed attacks. This provides 
information about how measurement error may affect the regression analyses on the 
larger GTD. 
The dependent variable in the regression models measures whether or not the 
attack was claimed (i.e., is a binary variable with values of 0/1), which requires 
analysis using a nonlinear model. I use STATA 9.2’s logit procedure to run the 
appropriate logistic regression on the data. Significance in the specific target and time 
variables are based on a one-tailed test with alpha = 0.05, while all other variables 
reflect two-tailed hypothesis testing with alpha = 0.05.  
Three models are evaluated. The first only includes those variables related to 
targets, tactics, success, and casualties. The second and third models include years, 
examining the effect of time under two alternative specifications. The second model 
includes 26 dummy variables indicating year (1970 being the reference year) so that a 
linear relationship of claim status over time is not assumed. The third model treats 
time as continuous and investigates the potential for linear and curvilinear change in 
















 I will first run the three models on the large data in its entirety (N = 854) to 
examine how the original data looks. Then, to examine the extent that measurement 
error affects the results, I use the 100 recoded cases database to compare model 
results using the originally-coded claim status (imported from the GTD) versus the 
recoded claim status. This comparison will inform us about the validity of the 
dependent variable as originally coded. If results using the GTD claim status differ 
from those using recoded cases, then measurement error in the GTD may confound 
analyses on claiming attacks. I then further investigate the effect of measurement 
error on the larger database by comparing the analysis on the recoded cases (N = 100) 
to a subsample of the large dataset that contains only cases from 1977 to 1997 (N = 
423). Using this subsample in the large database makes the GTD directly comparable 





Chapter 3: Results 
 
Description of Variables 
 A look at the descriptives in Table 1 demonstrates that a majority (66 percent) 
of terrorist attacks in the United States are claimed. Of the types of targets, almost 
two-thirds (64 percent) are specific targets while 36 percent of attacks targeted the 
general population. Bombing is clearly the terrorist tactic of choice, making up 79 
percent of all attacks; facility attacks make up 11 percent of attacks while all other 
tactics (assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, assaults, and arsons) comprise 10 
percent. The incidents in the data are predominantly successful ones (83 percent) but 
tend to involve few casualties (2.59 on average). Terrorists operating in the United 
States attack U.S. targets (as opposed to foreign-born nationals or foreign businesses) 
about three-fourths of the time. Most attacks occurred earlier in data collection; 66 
percent of attacks in the U.S. occurred before the mean year 1978.  
 
Table 1: Descriptives of Variables Included in Models 
Variable Name      N Range Mean SD 
Attack Claimed 854 0 – 1 .66 .47 
General Population
a 
854 0 – 1 .36 .48 
Specific Target
 
854 0 – 1 .64 .48 
Bombing
a 
854 0 – 1 .79 .41 
Facility Attack 854 0 – 1 .11 .31 
Other Tactic 854 0 – 1 .10 .30 
Success 854 0 – 1 .83 .37 
Casualties
 
854 0 – 1006 2.59 39.51 
Casualties (logged) 854 -6.91 – 6.91 -5.49 2.99 
US Target        854 0 – 1 .77 .42 







As mentioned above, a key limitation in using the GTD in the present research 
is the possibility that media sources were attributing terrorist incidents to groups 
without a formal claim. Such attributions would be coded as claimed in the GTD, thus 
it is necessary to determine the precision of the GTD’s “attack claimed” variable. To 
do this, I recoded the claim status of 100 randomly-selected cases, looking for explicit 
statements indicating whether the terrorists responsible contacted the media. 
Comparing the percent of claimed attacks in the recoded cases to that for the 
GTD (Table 2), one sees that a smaller proportion of incidents in the smaller database 
were coded as claimed. A chi-square test proved that amount of cases coded 
differently between the two data sets did not occur by chance (χ
2
= 38.72, p<0.01); 
after matching the recoded cases to their counterparts in the GTD, 19 percent (19 out 
of 100) cases were miscoded in the GTD.  Of the miscoded cases, 7 were originally 
coded as unclaimed and 12 were originally coded as claimed. These results imply that 
associating a group with an incident in the media is not the same as a group claiming 
responsibility for the incident. 
Table 2 provides descriptives from the 100 recoded cases as compared to 
GTD data. The unavailability of information affected the comparability of the data to 
the larger GTD such that the new database does not contain any incidents occurring 
before 1977 (see methods section). To obtain a direct comparison between the two 







Table 2: Descriptives of Variables Included in Models, GTD Cases (1977 – 1997) 
Compared to 100 Recoded Cases 
Variable 
Name      
GTD 1977 – 1997 100 Recoded Cases 
 N Range Mean SD N Range Mean SD 









423 0 – 1 .70 .46 100 0 – 1 .83 .38 
Bombing
a 
423 0 – 1 .72 .45 100 0 – 1 .73 .45 
Facility 
Attack 
423 0 – 1 .16 .37 100 0 – 1 .05 .22 
O her Tactic 423 0 – 1 .11 .31 100 0 – 1 .24 .43 
Success 423 0 – 1 .76 .43 100 0 – 1 .82 .39 
Casualties  
    (logged) 
423 -6.91 – 
6.91 
-5.24 3.19 100 -6.91 – 
3.87 
-4.95 3.36 
US Target        423 0 – 1 .75 .43 100 0 – 1 .67 .47 
Year 423 1977 – 
1997 






Description of Claimed versus Unclaimed Attacks 
Examining the choice to claim in more detail provides a better understanding 
of the rational decisions behind terrorist planning and the differences between 
terrorist groups (Rapoport, 1997), as well as how measurement error affects my 
results. Drawing on the in-depth information in the 100-case database, this section 
first discusses differences between miscoded (i.e., truly claimed attacks were coded as 
unclaimed, or vice versa) and correctly-coded cases to see how measurement error 
may affect the findings. Then, I describe the claimed versus unclaimed attacks in 
terms of situational factors (e.g., time period), the context of the attack itself (e.g., 




consequences of the attack (e.g., casualties, arrests made, increased public fear, extra 
security, or policy changes). I also briefly describe the content of formal claims.  
 
Comparing Miscoded to Correctly Coded Cases 
To investigate how measurement error may impact the larger model, 
Appendix A compares miscoded cases to correctly-coded incidents to determine 
whether the miscoded cases look more similar to claimed or unclaimed attacks. 
Recall that seven cases were originally coded unclaimed and recoded as claimed, 
while twelve cases were originally coded as claimed and recoded as unclaimed. I ran 
t-tests to compare claimed vs. miscoded means, then unclaimed vs. miscoded means. 
I then ran ANOVAs and Tukey's B post-hoc tests to determine how the three 
categories looked when all were included in the analyses. Although there were few 
differences of note, I found that miscoded cases were significantly more likely to 
have involved arrests than either correctly-coded category.   
Since miscoded cases do not look more like claimed as opposed to unclaimed 
attacks (or vice-versa), there is no strong evidence suggesting bias in the data such 
that claimed or unclaimed cases are more likely to be miscoded. The important 
variable, instead, is whether an arrest was made in the case. Cases may have been 
originally coded as claimed because someone was arrested, and therefore the incident 
could be attributed to a particular group although no formal claim was made. For 
those cases incorrectly marked unclaimed, it may be that the original coders did not 
put a group name when the responsible group was ambiguous (e.g., if an individual 




remainder of this section examines the differences between truly claimed and 
unclaimed attacks (see Table 3); knowing how they differ provides a better 
understanding about what variables drive a terrorist to claim responsibility.  
 
Table 3: Means and t-test Results for Variables Related to Terrorist Claim-making, 
Claimed Attacks Compared to Unclaimed Attacks 
Variable Name      Claimed Unclaimed 
 N Mean N Mean 
Time Period* 51 1983 49 1989 
Situational Variables     
    Tactics     
        Facility Attack 51 .06 49 .04 
        Bombing
†
          51 .80 49 .65 
        Other Tactic 51 .18 49 .31 
    Targets     
        General Population 51 .16 48 .19 
        Specific Targets 51 .84 48 .81 
        U.S. Target*                51 .55 48 .79 
    Success 51 .86 49 .78 
Consequences     
    Civilians killed
†
 51 .08 49 .39 
    Civilians wounded 51 .35 49 1.24 
    Terrorists  
       killed/wounded 
51 .10 49 .24 
    Arrest Made 51 .29 48 .40 
    Number of Arrests 15 2.87 19 2.79 
Public Response     
   Extra Security 51 .41 49 .29 
   Public Fear
†
 51 .22 49 .37 
   Policy Change 51 .16 49 .16 
Description of Claim     
   Specific Demand 51 .39 -- -- 
   Retaliation 51 .43 -- -- 
   Future Attacks 51 .41 -- -- 
†






Claimed and unclaimed attacks vary significantly in terms of prevalence over 
time. The average year of claimed attacks is 1983 while the average year for 
unclaimed attacks is about six years later, in 1989. When examining the distribution 
across time, the differences are clearer; the median of claimed attacks is 1982 while 
the median of unclaimed attacks is 1993. 
 
Tactics Employed 
Unclaimed and claimed attacks look similar in the tactics involved. Claimed 
attacks involved warnings of the incident slightly more often; 18 percent of claimed 
incidents issued a warning prior to the attack compared to 13 percent of unclaimed 
incidents. Bombing is the favored tactic in both types of incidents (80 percent of 
claimed, 65 percent of unclaimed and 73 percent overall), but marginally more likely 
in claimed attacks. Facility attacks (those incidents in which the attackers were 
present at the time) were least likely to be used; this tactic was used in five percent of 
all incidents—six percent of claimed, and four percent of unclaimed. Attacks left 
unclaimed were slightly more likely to involve “other” tactics in place of explosions.  
 
Weapons Used 
Figure 1 shows that a majority of both claimed and unclaimed attacks used 
explosives. Out of 51 claimed attacks, 37 involved bombs (74 percent) compared to 




likely to involve some form of arson (18 percent, as opposed to about 15 percent of 
unclaimed attacks involving arson). A much higher proportion of unclaimed attacks 
(23 percent) involved firearms than claimed attacks (4 percent)
5
, while the only 
attacks in the database using knives/sharp objects or other weapons were both 
claimed. 
 























































Claimed and unclaimed attacks seem to target both the general population and 
specific individuals with similar prevalence. Of claimed attacks, about 16 percent 
targeted the general population while 84 percent targeted specific entities. Unclaimed 
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 Differences were marginally significant (χ
2




attacks targeted the general population about 19 percent of the time and specific 
targets about 81 percent of the time. Both claimed and unclaimed terrorist operations 
involved 1.67 unique incidents on average. The significant difference in targeting 
U.S. citizens or property is notable; 79 percent of unclaimed attacks target U.S. 
citizens or property as opposed to only 55 percent of claimed attacks.   
When targets are broken into 21 unique categories, only three differences 
between claimed and unclaimed attacks stand out. Figure 2 illustrates that a higher 
proportion of unclaimed attacks involved abortion-related targets (about 10 percent 
versus two percent of claimed attacks) and journalists and media (10 percent versus 
two percent of claimed attacks). Conversely, unclaimed attacks were less likely to 
target diplomatic targets (about eight percent versus about 28 percent of claimed 
attacks). Terrorists attempting to disrupt international relations seem to take credit 
more often, while abortion clinic attackers and those targeting the media are satisfied 
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Terrorist attacks were generally successful, which is not surprising given that 
media attention emphasizes actual (not merely intended) violence. Therefore, 
successful attacks are more likely to be included in this data. Success was slightly 
more frequent among claimed attacks (86 percent) than unclaimed attacks (78 
percent). 
 
Consequences of the Attack 
Unclaimed attacks involve more victim casualties than claimed attacks 
(t=1.95, p<0.10). Unclaimed attacks average 1.24 victims wounded and 0.39 killed 




attacks also have more terrorist casualties on average (but this is not statistically 
significant). An average of 0.24 terrorists were killed or wounded in unclaimed 
attacks, compared to 0.10 terrorists killed or wounded in claimed attacks.  
Also of note is that arrests are slightly more likely in unclaimed attacks 
(though not statistically significant). Forty percent of unclaimed attacks resulted in an 
arrest while only 29 percent of claimed attacks resulted in an arrest. When an arrest 
occurred, unclaimed attacks produced about 2.79 arrests on average while claimed 
attacks produce 2.87 arrests on average. It seems that claiming an attack may not 
increase the actual risk of being arrested.  
 
Public Response 
I also examined differences in how the media presented public responses to 
claimed or unclaimed attacks. The recoded 100-case database includes whether the 
articles mentioned anything about public fear, increased security around the target 
location, or policy changes (including legislative changes or negotiations with 
terrorists).   
Mention of public fear occurred more often when the attack went unclaimed; 
it was mentioned in 37 percent of unclaimed attacks as opposed to 22 percent of 
claimed attacks. Moreover, themes of reported public fear differed by claim status. In 
stories about attacks not followed by claims, there were more mentions of the random 
nature of the attack and of the innocence of the victims. Civilians were buying 
bulletproof vests and weapons, and there were mentions of people calling in 




When an attack was claimed, the mention of public fear seems to focus more 
on the location; fear was not described as being widespread. For example, tourists 
said they would never visit New York again, neighborhood residents were frightened, 
or the passengers on a hijacked plane were panicked. In fact, anger and defiance by 
targets were reported more often. People were quoted as saying that they would not 
bend to terrorist will, or expressed anger at law enforcement for not doing enough to 
protect the targets. From my observations, the general public does not seem to fear 
terrorists as much when they provide an explanation for their actions.  
The mention of extra security in newspaper articles occurred more often when 
an attack was claimed (41 percent) than unclaimed (29 percent; not statistically 
significant). The articles for unclaimed attacks seem to mention “extra police 
protection” or “increased monitoring” generally, while articles on claimed attacks 
included more specific preventive measures (e.g., reviewing mail-handling practices, 
examining known prior sites of attacks by the terrorist group, removing lockers from 
the train station).  
When more is learned about the attackers and their motivations via 
communiqués, law enforcement authorities may be more confident in outlining 
specific steps to keep the public safe and allay fears. Public figures and law 
enforcement feel they can more specifically address security weaknesses when they 
understand the motives behind the attack (via communication from the terrorists 
themselves); in such cases, it seems they are more inclined to speak specifically about 




Mentions of policy changes in the media occurred at the same frequency for 
both types of attacks (16 percent of both claimed and unclaimed), but differed by type 
in terms of the content of such changes. Obviously, negotiations with terrorists can 
occur only when attacks are claimed. Terrorists who identify themselves may achieve 
small concessions (e.g., getting their manifestoes published) by threatening more 
violence. When examining the differences between claimed and unclaimed attacks’ 
media coverage, I noticed that when an attack goes unclaimed, the incident is more 
often used as a springboard for broader legislation that seeks to prevent future attacks 
(e.g., by restricting access to weapons via anti-gun legislation). When the terrorists 
are unknown, it seems that prevention focuses on broad legislative efforts; when 
attacks are claimed, such efforts tend to involve specific crime-prevention measures.  
 
Description of Claims 
Newspaper articles generally do not give many specifics of what a terrorist 
manifesto or communiqué contains, but instead discuss such claims in general 
themes. Of the 51 claimed attacks, terrorists made specific demands 39 percent of the 




Effect of Measurement Error, Small Database 
 Before interpreting findings from the full model, it is important to determine 




assume that an attack is formally claimed because a media outlet attributes an attack 
to a particular terrorist? Table 4 shows the full model run in the small 100 recoded-
cases database, first using the original coding and then using the recoded claim status.  
If the results differ between these two regressions, the results for the larger 
model presented above are likely biased. Appendix B provides illustrations depicting 
how this bias may manifest. Figure B.1 shows that if, in reality, specific targets 
increase the likelihood of a claim, then miscoding unclaimed attacks as claimed will 
bias the results toward zero. With this positive relationship, miscoding claimed 
attacks as unclaimed attacks would exaggerate a positive relationship. Conversely, if 
the true relationship between specific targets and claims is negative (as depicted in 
Figure B.2) then miscoding unclaimed attacks as claimed will exaggerate the 
relationship while miscoding claimed attacks as unclaimed will bias the coefficient 
toward zero.  
 
Table 4:  Effect of Specific Targets on Claim-making in 100-case Database, Original 
Claim Code Compared to Recoded Claim Code  
Variable Name      Original Claim Status Recoded Claim Status 






Model 3 Odds 
Ratios 
Specific Target .80 (.60) 2.23 .11 (.59) 1.12 
US Target        .11 (.61) 1.12 -.85 (.57) .43 
Facility Attack       -.30 (1.40) .74 .98 (1.55) 2.67 
Other Tactic -.29 (.61) .75 -.85 (.60) .43 
Success .74 (.58) 2.09 .83 (.63) 2.30 
Casualties -.03 (.08) .97 -.11 (.04) 1.02 
Year
 
-.12** (.04) .88 -.11** (.04) .90 
Note. The quadratic term for year was not significant for either sample. The results reported here are 






 Comparing the results, it appears that measurement error did not alter the 
significant findings from the model. Both analyses show that the only variable 
significantly predicting whether an attack is claimed is the year of the attack (βoriginal= 
-0.12, βrecoded= -0.11). In both models, attacks are less likely to be claimed in later 
years. However, the coefficient for the specific target variable decreases in 
magnitude, which may be evidence of bias (i.e., the positive relationship may be 
exaggerated in the GTD). It may be that unclaimed attacks were disproportionately 
likely to be coded as claimed in the large database. The coefficient for specific targets 
remains positive using the 100 recoded claims, therefore the extent of measurement 
error in the GTD is unclear—the change in magnitude may be related to the different 
sample sizes.  
 
 
Logistic Regression on Full GTD Database 
Table 5 shows the results from the regression on the full GTD database (N = 
854)
7
. The first model contains variables related to the target type (specific target, 
U.S. target), tactic used (facility attack or other tactic), whether the incident was 
successful, and the number of casualties. In this model, only engaging in a facility 
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 In studying the raw data, some cases were observed that had outlying studentized residuals. When 
regressions were conducted including and excluding these cases, the results did not differ; thus the 
cases were retained in the final model run. Multicollinearity also proved not to be an issue in either of 
the datasets. Variables not belonging to mutually exclusive categories (e.g., the three binary indicators 
denoting tactic) did not exhibit correlations of more than 0.37, nor did standard errors change 
significantly with the inclusion of individual variables (not shown). The independent variables of 






attack compared to bombing (β= -1.08) and the number of casualties (β= -0.07) 
significantly influenced the decision to issue a formal claim. 
The second model adds in dummy variables for the 26 years of data (1970 
serves as the reference group). It is when I control for years that a target variable 
becomes significant; attacking a specific target (β= 0.45) is not significantly less 
likely to result in a formal claim, while targeting a U.S. citizen or U.S. property (β= 
0.59) is significantly more likely to predict issuance of a formal claim. Certain years 
also exhibit significant relationships with formal claims; in 1994 – 1997 (β1994 = -
2.34, β1995 = -2.09, β1996 = -2.43, β1997 = -1.94) incidents were significantly less likely 
to be followed up with formal claims when compared to 1970. 
 The third model investigates the potential for a linear and quadratic trend over 
time. In this model, year was transformed into a count variable (range 0 – 27) and 
treated as continuous. Including the linear specification of year produces a strong 
negative relationship between time and claim-making, (β= -0.09, p<0.01), but there is 
evidence of a quadratic relationship. The linear coefficient (β= 0.23) and quadratic 
coefficient (β= -0.01) for year were significant at p<0.01 when allowing for two-
tailed significance, therefore a curvilinear relationship is retained in the model. In this 
model, targeting a specific target (β= 0.49) does not significantly decrease the 
probability of an attack being followed with a formal claim
8
, while targeting U.S. 
property or citizens (β= 0.81) increases the probability of a claim. Incidents involving 
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 Since I sometimes employed tactics to identify the target as the general public or not, it was important 
to investigate the possibility that including these variables in the model was affecting the results. A 
chi-square test indicates that there is a relationship between a target being identified as the general 
public and whether a bomb was used (GTD: χ
2
=34.22, p<0.01; 100-case database: χ
2
=4.73, p<0.05). I 
re-ran all regressions excluding tactics and found no significant impact on the retained variables’ 




a facility attack were less likely to be followed with a formal claim (β= -0.14) than 
bombing incidents. All other control variables remained nonsignificant at p<0.05. 
 
Table 5: Effect of Specific Targets on Claim-making, Full GTD 




 β(SE) β (SE) Odds Ratio β (SE) Odds Ratio 
Specific Target .15 (.17) .45 (.21) 1.56 .49 (.20) 1.63 
US Target        .10 (.19) .59* (.25) 1.80 .81** (.22) 2.25 
Facility Attack      -1.08** (.24) .12 (.37) 1.12 -.14* (.30) .87 
Other Tactic .13 (.30) .31 (.40) 1.36 .30 (.36) 1.35 
Success .02 (.20) -.21 (.23) .81 -.10 (.22) .91 
Casualties -.07* (.03) -.06
†
 (.04) .94 -.07
†
 (.04) .94 
Year -- -- -- .23** (.04) 1.26 
Year (quadratic) -- -- -- -.01** (.00) 0.99 
1971 -- .43 (.31) 1.53 -- -- 
1972 -- 1.06 (.63) 2.89 -- -- 
1973 -- 1.34 (.52) 3.81 -- -- 
1974 -- 1.34 (.50) 3.81 -- -- 
1975 -- 1.62 (.37) 5.05 -- -- 
1976 -- .70 (.37) 2.02 -- -- 
1977 -- 2.73 (.52) 15.37 -- -- 
1978 -- .48 (.49) 1.61 -- -- 
1979 -- .35 (.45) 1.42 -- -- 
1980 -- .66 (.51) 1.93 -- -- 
1981 -- 1.47 (.58) 4.36 -- -- 
1982 -- 1.10 (.51) 2.99 -- -- 
1983 -- 1.13 (.73) 3.11 -- -- 
1984 -- 1.80 (1.10) 6.07 -- -- 
1985 -- -.27 (0.80) .77 -- -- 
1986 -- .46 (.92) 1.58 -- -- 
1989 -- -.40 (.73) .67 -- -- 
1992 -- -.57 (1.14) .57 -- -- 
1994 -- -2.34** (.72) .10 -- -- 
1995 -- -2.09** (.57) .12 -- -- 
1996 -- -2.43** (.69) .09 -- -- 
1997 -- -1.94** (.56) .14 -- -- 
Note: N= 854 in Models 1 and 3. N = 837 in Model 2 because certain years contained exclusively 










Comparison of GTD (1977 – 1997) and 100 Recoded Cases 
To more thoroughly examine the validity of the analysis on the GTD, I 
thought it would be best to compare the results from the 100 recoded cases to cases in 
the GTD. No cases before 1977 were included in the small 100-case database (see 
methods section) therefore I used only GTD cases from the same time period for 
comparison.  Looking at Table 6,  the full model on the GTD cases from 1977 – 1997 
(N = 423) produces results in which the specific target variable is nonsignificant (β = 
0.15), attacking a U.S. target positively and significantly influences claim status (β = 
0.80), engaging in a facility attack (β= -1.01) is significantly less likely to produce a 
formal claim when compared to bombing, other tactic (β= 0.08), success of the attack 
(β= 0.50) and the number of people killed or wounded (β= -0.04) are not significant 
predictors of claims at p<0.05, and year has a significant linear negative relationship 
with claim status (β= -0.17). The model using the recoded sample of 100 cases 
produces different results. In this model, only year exhibited a significant effect claim 
status (β= -0.11).  
 This comparison illuminates some differences not found in Table 4. There 
may not be enough power in the smaller database to detect true differences arising 
from measurement error. The variables “U.S. Target” and “Facility Attack” in Table 
6 have the same direction as their counterparts in Table 4; the original coding results 
in coefficients of the opposite direction from the recoded cases. Whether 
measurement error has biased the results in the larger GTD will remain unconfirmed 





 Table 6: Effect of Specific Targets on Claim-making, 100 Random Cases Compared 
to GTD (1977 – 1997)  
Variable Name      Large Database (N = 423) Small Database (N = 100)
 






Model 3 Odds 
Ratios 
Specific Target .15 (.29) 1.16 .11 (.59) 1.12 
U.S. Target        .80** (.30) 2.22 -.85 (.57) .43 
Facility Attack       -1.01* (.41) .36 .98 (1.55) 2.67 
Other Tactic .08 (.45) 1.09 -.85 (.60) .43 
Success .50
†
 (.28) 1.64 .83 (.63) 2.30 
Casualties -.04 (.05) .96 -.11 (.04) 1.02 
Year
 
-.17** (.02) .84 -.11** (.04) .90 
Note. The quadratic term for year was not significant for either sample. The results reported here are 
for the model was with only the linear coefficient included. 
†
p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 
 
Results for GTD Incidents from 1970 – 1976 vs. 1977 – 1997 
Given the changes in the full regression on the larger GTD when isolating the 
years from 1977 – 1997, it was worthwhile to explore how the model changes when 
comparing subsets of the GTD. To this end, I ran the model separately on GTD 
incidents occurring from 1970 – 1976 and compared the results to those for incidents 
occurring from 1977 – 1997 (see Table 7). 
 When examining cases from 1970 – 1976 (N = 431), targeting a specific entity 
(β= 0.69) does not predict a lower probability of formally claiming an attack, 
targeting a United States citizen or property (β= 0.83) increases the likelihood of 
terrorists issuing a formal claim, engaging in a facility attack (β= 1.96) increases 
likelihood of issuing a claim compared to bombing attacks, successful incidents are 
less likely to be followed up with formal claims (β= -1.08), more casualties decreases 




significantly increases the probability of the attack being claimed, and the quadratic 
year term (β= -0.11) significantly decreased the likelihood of claiming an attack. 
Engaging in other tactics compared to bombing was not significantly associated with 
claim status. 
 This contrasts those attacks occurring from 1977 – 1997 (N = 423), in which 
the only two predictors of claims (at p<0.05) were targeting U.S. property or citizens 
(β= 0.84) and engaging in a facility attack (which was less likely to result in a formal 
claim than bombings; β= -1.00). From 1977 – 1997, time did not have a significant 
effect on claim status when the quadratic term was included. When I ran the model 
without the quadratic term, the results for the time-unrelated variables remained the 
same, but there is a significant negative linear effect of time on claim status (β= -0.17, 
p<0.01).  
 
Table 7: Effect of Specific Targets on Claim-making in GTD, 1970 – 1976 versus 
1977 - 1997 
Variable Name      1970 – 1976 (N = 431) 1977 – 1997 (N = 423) 




Specific Target .69 (.28) 1.99 .15 (.29) 1.16 
US Target        .83* (.33) 2.29 .84** (.31) 2.31 
Facility Attack       1.96* (.85) 7.12 -1.00* (.40) .37 
Other Tactic .62 (.49) 1.86 .06 (.46) 1.06 
Success -1.08* (.47) .34 .48
†
 (.28) 1.62 
Casualties -.14** (.13) .87 -.04 (.05) .96 
Year .81** (.05) 2.26 -.09 (.13) .92 





Chapter 4:  Discussion 
 
The present research explored a unique but neglected area of terrorism, the 
decision by terrorists to formally claim responsibility for an attack. Logistic 
regression was applied to U.S. terror incident characteristics and tested the hypothesis 
that terrorists would be less likely to claim responsibility after attacking a specific 
individual or organization. In the full regression models including all available data 
from 1970 - 1997, this hypothesis was not supported; in fact, the specific target 
coefficient exhibited a strong positive relationship with claims
9
.  
Instead of prioritizing the benefits of claiming an attack, it may be that 
terrorists are more likely to claim an attack after striking a specific target because the 
costs of claim-making are greater after targeting the general public. It has been noted 
that targeting the general public increases the number of casualties and results in 
increased counterterrorism efforts, which are better avoided by remaining anonymous 
(Gearson, 2002; Hoffman, 1996, 1997; Rapoport, 1997).  Further, when random 
victims are targeted terrorists may find it more difficult to obtain public support even 
if they release a statement (Ross and Gurr, 1989; USIP, 1999).  When costs are 
perceived to be greater than the benefits, remaining anonymous may be the better 
decision (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Hoffman, 1999; Picard, 1993; Poland, 1988).  
Further, not claiming attacks may have benefits aside from merely avoiding 
costs. Terrorists may maximize the element of unpredictability by remaining silent, a 
strategy that complements the targeting of random victims for those seeking to evoke 
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 If the coefficient had been evaluated as a 2-tailed test, this relationship would have been significant in 




public anxiety (Garrison, 2003; Gearson, 2002; Hoffman, 1997). In the descriptive 
comparison of claimed and unclaimed attacks, newspaper reports focused on the 
widespread public fear occurring after an unclaimed attack. When attacks are 
claimed, media reports indicate the public is not as apprehensive overall. People 
instead fear specific locations and express more contempt for those responsible when 
they know why the attack occurred.  
A recurring theme in the literature is that terrorist claim-making and related 
factors have changed over time (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Hoffman, 1996, 1997, 
1999; for a criticism of this viewpoint, see Crenshaw, 2000, 2006). I hypothesized 
that there would be a significant negative relationship between time and claim-
making, which is partially supported. The significant quadratic relationship between 
the year of the attack and claim status implies that the probability of claiming an 
attack increases with time, then either decreases or decelerates after a certain point. 
Figure 3 illustrates this pattern; after 1984, the proportion of claimed cases in each 
year appears to decrease with the exception of 1993
10
.  
Scholars speculate that over time, terrorist attacks changed such that the 
general population was more likely to be targeted and terrorist attacks were less likely 
to be followed by a claim (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Gearson, 2002; Hoffman, 
1999). They argue that a new terrorism has emerged over time aiming to punish 
members of innocent societies as opposed to convincing the public of their moral 
righteousness; now, both civilians and officials are considered to be legitimate targets 
(Enders and Sandler, 2000). Another driving force in the decreased likelihood of 
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 It may be that the 1993 data are all coded as claimed because of the inability to recover unclaimed 




claims may be increased costs associated with increased counterterrorism efforts 
(Hoffman, 1996, 1999). 
 
This study indicates that terrorist attacks occurring in the early and mid-1970s 
seem to be qualitatively different from those since; different factors influence how 
terrorists choose to communicate their grievance from one time period to the next. In 
early terrorist incidents (1970 – 1976) recorded in the GTD, formal claims for attacks 
are more likely when attacks are directed at U.S. targets, involve a facility attack as 
opposed to a bombing, are unsuccessful, have less casualties, and have a curvilinear 
relationship over these six years. In later terrorist attacks (1977 – 1997), formal 
claims are more likely when attacks are against U.S. citizens and involve bombings as 
opposed to facility attacks, but are significantly less likely as years go by. It is 
interesting that factors relevant in explaining earlier media manipulation differ from 
those in later incidents. There is a clear need to identify those factors affecting 

























































































































current terrorism; by comparing recent attacks to old forms of terrorism, researchers 
can better identify what is driving contemporary terrorist agendas (Crenshaw, 2000).  
 
Theoretical Implications 
 The present research extends the application of rational choice theory to 
terrorist considerations in planning attacks. The findings suggest that terrorists weigh 
the pros and cons of claiming an attack, and that this decision changes over time and 
is affected by other factors. Previous research has demonstrated how terrorists choose 
targets, but no previous studies have investigated how target choice affects other 
decisions relevant to attack planning and execution.   
The research here demonstrates that certain variables like the nationality of 
the target, the tactic chosen, and the number of victims affects whether terrorists will 
communicate with the media post-attack. The finding of a positive effect of specific 
targets on claim-making encourages future research into different costs and benefits 
that may explain this relationship. It may be that when the general population (seen as 
less legitimate; Clarke and Newman, 2006; Hoffman, 1999; Picard, 1993) is targeted, 
terrorists realize that they are not likely to gain support from the public and instead 
prioritize avoiding the costs (e.g., reduced anonymity and increased vulnerability to 
counterterrorism strategies) of announcing their involvement. If this is the case, this 
would provide evidence that certain terrorist groups are not concerned with public 
support but instead attempt to maximize public anxiety by choosing random victims 




This study has also contributed to theory by showing that terrorists’ rational 
choices change over time—relevant choice-structuring properties at one time period 
may no longer be relevant 20 years later. This has important implications to 
displacement literature, as attack-specific properties (e.g., targets, use of weapons) 
that guide terrorists may change. This is analogous to Clarke and Cornish’s (1987) 
discussion of how suicide rates change over time, as individuals learn new methods 
(with different benefits and costs than previous methods) of doing so. Knowledge 
about changes in terrorist resources and objectives will help scholars and 




Policy should emphasize increased understanding of the motives driving 
target choice, seek methods to prevent attacks, and better control the influence of the 
attack after it occurs. There are two themes to policy proposals in the literature: 
prevention and counterterrorism. The present research implies that certain factors 
affect terrorists’ use of publicity. The prevention efforts discussed below seem more 
appropriate for those terrorists who pay attention to (and rely on) mainstream media 
attention, while counterterrorism strategies may prove more relevant for terrorists 






While governing agencies cannot prevent terrorist attacks from receiving 
attention, they may be able to influence how such events are portrayed to the public 
and thus reduce support for the organization (Ross and Gurr, 1989; USIP, 1999). 
Previously, the media has been used ineffectively by biased parties to provoke moral 
outrage in the population for the purpose of securing resources for their cause. Media 
demonization of criminals such as gang members and organized crime syndicates 
illustrates how the media inspires shallow assessments of the causes of crime and 
leads to short-term policies that do not adequately address the issues at hand 
(Skaperdas, 2001).  Similarly, fully understanding how terrorists use publicity for 
their own gains is important for legislators to develop effective policies. For those 
terrorists who seek attention from mainstream media, authorities may find they can 
use such channels to disseminate information to the public and terrorists. 
Clarke and Newman (2006) directly apply situational crime prevention 
policies to the manipulation of media before and after a terrorist attack. It is vital to 
not just continually react to attacks but also engage in prevention by exaggerating 
weaknesses of the group in the media through focused messages to a target audience 
(e.g., the community or the terrorist group). This strategy applies whether the group is 
known or not—authorities can stigmatize the methods used, even without identifying 
responsible parties.  
Applying five principles of situational crime prevention (SCP) to post-attack 




difficult for the group. The first method is to increase the effort the offense requires 
by publicizing new protective procedures. When authorities do this, terrorists are 
likely to look for alternative targets that involve less effort (but will likely have fewer 
benefits; Sandler, 2003).  
The second method offered by SCP is to increase the risks by publicizing law 
enforcement efforts to reduce anonymity (e.g., random searches, surveillance 
technology), or by increasing the group’s sense of paranoia (e.g., intimating that the 
group has been infiltrated). The third principle is to reduce rewards by continuously 
characterizing attacks as unsuccessful, regardless of the amount of damage and 
violence. Post-incident statements should emphasize that terrorists will not be able to 
achieve their goals. Efforts should be made to swiftly clean up the site and arrest 
responsible parties. Additionally, unsuccessful attempts should be highly publicized.  
The fourth method of SCP is to reduce provocations. Terrorist groups attempt 
to provoke violent reactions by governments, which they then use to legitimize future 
violence on their part. Although authorities should not appear weak, they cannot 
overreact with excessively punitive measures and increase support for the terrorist 
groups. The fifth principle of SCP is to reduce excuses. Terrorists are very concerned 
with how their actions are perceived and often attempt to justify their attacks. If 
authorities use the media to emphasize the callousness and hypocrisy of terrorist 
actions (e.g., when religion serves as justification for terrorists), they may produce 
uncertainty in supporters and operatives, making recruitment more difficult for the 
group. To this end, the government should avoid using metaphors of warfare when 




Alternative approaches such as independent media or dialogues between authorities 
and terrorists further reduce excuses (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Clarke and 
Newman, 2006).   
 
Counterterrorism Measures 
The research presented here implies that targeting the general public may 
reduce the likelihood of terrorist communications after the attack. Therefore, terrorists 
engaging in violent acts against the general public may not be placated by alternative 
media sources, and resources may be better spent in another manner. Public but 
unclaimed attacks are primarily attributed to religious extremists and amateur 
terrorists. Religiously-motivated terrorists consider their violence to be justified by 
religious doctrine and do not need public support, while amateurs tend to have vague 
objectives not easily communicated (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Gearson, 2002; 
Hoffman, 1996, 1999). 
Previously successful prevention strategies may no longer be applicable with 
new terrorist motives and innovations. Enders and Sandler (2000) argue that new 
terrorist groups embrace the risks involved in terrorist attacks while non-religious 
terrorists in earlier decades were more risk-averse. Policies attempting to adjust 
terrorist decision-making by increasing risks or expense may thus be ineffective or 
even lead to unintended consequences. For example, target-hardening may promote 
attacks against less protected targets which result in more casualties (Jenkins, 2001).   
With new forms of terrorism, it may be more effective to focus on disintegrating the 




Other scholars, like Crenshaw (2000) and Frey and Leuchinger (2003), argue 
that relying on punitive measures oversimplifies motivations and actually may induce 
more attacks because underlying issues are not resolved. Instead, reintegrative 
strategies (those that shame but ultimately forgive offenders and fully restore their 
status in society; Braithwaite, 1989) allay feelings of alienation and rejection. 
However, one must know who is responsible to initiate the process of reintegration. It 
may be necessary to increase intelligence and infiltration to identify those 
responsible, and then incorporate reintegrative policies when applying sanctions. 
There is a clear need to analyze effects of various policies on groups with diverse 
characteristics (e.g., differing motivations or social support; Crenshaw, 2000). 
 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The present research provides information on how target choice may be 
associated with claims and sets up an initial procedure by which further research can 
detail the decision-making processes of terrorists. Much work remains to address the 
limitations of the present study and further investigate these findings. First and 
foremost, when entering data from media reports it is imperative that future 
researchers explicitly code whether an attack is claimed or not. Although the GTD 
uses a very broad definition for including attacks into the database, an important 
contribution of the present research was the identification of existing measurement 




found to have been miscoded as claimed when in fact the media attributed the attack 
to a group without formal issuance of a manifesto or other communication.  
When comparing regressions using the original claimed status to the recoded 
data in the 100 randomly-sampled cases, measurement error does not alter the 
interpretation of the findings although some evidence of bias exists. After comparing 
the models using recoded claim status to the larger GTD data, it seems that some 
differences due to measurement error may not have been detected due to the small 
sample size of the recoded data. Specifically, when I compared the cases in the 100-
recoded cases database to the GTD (see Table 6), the relationship between claims and 
variables describing targets and tactics differs.  While the differences did not 
significantly affect the interpretation of specific targets’ effects on claims for attacks, 
using the GTD to model terrorist claim-making is clearly problematic. Future efforts 
should use multiple coders and study the extent of measurement error in attacks 
occurring before 1977. 
An unintended benefit of the sensitivity analysis was that it also helped 
demonstrate time-specific effects of variables. When isolating the GTD data from 
1977 – 1997 for comparison to the recoded data, I noticed that the influence of 
variables changed in the model. This motivated a comparison of GTD data from 1970 
– 1976 to that for 1977 – 1997. However, it is important to note that the defined time 
periods were admittedly arbitrary, based on convenience rather than driven by theory. 
The research to date is fairly ambiguous as to when changes in attacks occur
11
. Future 
                                                 
11
 Enders and Sandler (2000) argue that the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran marked the 
beginning of increasing severity of terrorist attacks resulting from religious motivations. Gearson 




research should seek to clearly define a turning point by which analyses can be 
centered, compare various time points, or clearly delineate trends so researchers can 
better understand the facilitating factors after which terrorist tactics and motivations 
change. By understanding when terrorist tactics changed scientists will be better able 
to understand why they changed.  
It is also relevant that the analysis only contains data up to 1997; to fully 
understand the characteristics of contemporary terrorism, studies must use up-to-date 
information. By using older datasets, our capacity to understand and react to 
contemporary terrorists’ motivations is limited; there is a clear need to move beyond 
the event-driven research and develop the capacity to measure systematic change over 
time (Crenshaw, 2000). The change in terrorist attacks over time should be explored 
using other existing databases and other influential factors (e.g., group organization, 
group ideologies, counterterrorism efforts, state support, or other legislation). It 
would also be worthwhile to explore the generalizability of this research; perhaps 
terrorism in other countries manifests itself in different ways and exhibit different 
relationships between targets and media manipulation (Altheide, 1987).   
Although this research is informative and helps illuminate potential factors 
terrorists consider in planning attacks, the potential remains that important variables 
were omitted from the analysis. Indeed, looking at terrorism with such a broad scope 
is problematic itself. Every manifestation of terrorism carries different rewards, risks, 
and required skills (Crenshaw, 2000). Even within groups, terrorists are not exclusive 
in the methods or targets they select, and their motivations often change (Enders and 
                                                                                                                                           
forced the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces from Lebanon. Hoffman (1996, 1997, 1999) discusses 




Sandler, 2000; Gearson, 2002; Hoffman, 1996, 1997, 1999; Sandler, 2003; Vaisman-
Tzachor, 2006). Future research should disaggregate various attack-specific 
characteristics to fully understand and prevent terrorist incidents (Chermak and 
Gruenewald, 2006; Clarke and Newman, 2006).  
It would be useful to replicate the present analysis using different codes for 
targets. Perhaps classifying targets into two categories is not sufficiently specific, or 
there may be ways to improve the criteria used in the present research. For example, 
attacks against government targets may exhibit different effects when they are 
included as a unique target category (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Further, it may 
have been faulty to assume that targeting the general public sends an ambiguous 
message. For contemporary terrorists, targeting civilians may clearly symbolize their 
intent to destroy an impure world (Enders and Sandler, 2000; Hoffman, 1999). 
Group organization may also be important in ascertaining how targets are 
chosen and also how the media is used. It may be that smaller groups fear detection 
more than larger groups and are therefore more inclined to remain anonymous no 
matter their target. Additionally, the absence of a central leader in the group may 
result in fewer constraints on operations and a choice to engage in large-scale public 
attacks, in turn encouraging anonymity (Hoffman, 1999). The sensitivity analysis 
showed that about 20 percent of cases involved individuals, but there is no analogous 
measure in the GTD. There is a variable for “number of perpetrators” in the GTD, but 
data is missing for 845 (99 percent) incidents. If more information about the 
organization of the terrorist group (either by imputing missing values or explicitly 




may find that this information is related to target choice as well as use of the media 
for the benefit of the terrorist group. 
Previous research suggests that ideology likely informs the choice of a target 
and may determine whether the group is likely to claim responsibility for an attack 
(Cronin, 2002; Garrison, 2003; Hoffman, 1997). Unfortunately, the current database 
does not have consistent data on this variable, with the exception of abortion-related 
attacks. Identifying the groups’ ideologies is a project currently being undertaken by 
the University of Maryland’s START center. Furthermore, group organization and 
ideology are not feasible to include in my analysis due to the research question 
itself—if the attack goes unclaimed, then one cannot be certain that a terrorist group 
was responsible for it and therefore I would only be able to study organization and 
ideologies for those that claimed their attacks.  
Lastly, one of the limitations of all open-source databases including the GTD 
is the potential for bias such that anonymous terrorist attacks may not be recognized 
as such. Thus, unclaimed attacks included in the present data may be systematically 
different from those not included. To address this, future research should collect more 
data from non-media sources. By interviewing known terrorists and comparing court 
records for incidents that are claimed versus those unclaimed, researchers may be 
able to get a different perspective on the rationality of communicating with the media 
and of choosing targets. These data contain biases of their own but would 







 Despite the limitations, this research has contributed meaningfully to theory 
and policy by empirically studying a heretofore ignored aspect of terrorism. Claim-
making is a unique aspect of terrorism, but was generally taken for granted as a part 
of any terrorist plan. This research suggests that terrorists make a deliberate 
calculation before communicating with the public via media sources and that this 
decision-making process changes over time. Future policy should use this knowledge 
to reduce the rewards terrorists get from media coverage, or selectively engage in 






Table A.1: Descriptive Comparison of Miscoded Cases to Correctly-Coded Cases, 
Small Database 
Variable Name      Claimed Unclaimed Miscoded 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean 





Situational Variables       
    Tactics       
        Facility Attack 44 .05 37 .05 19 .05 
        Bombing          44 .82 37 .62 19 .74 
        Other Tactic 44 .18 37 .32 19 .21 
    Targets       
        General Population 44 .14 37 .19 19 .21 
        Specific Targets 44 .86 37 .81 19 .79 
        U.S. Target                44 .55 37 .78 19 .74 
    Success 44 .86 37 .76 19 .84 
Consequences       
    Civilians killed 44 .09 37 .43 19 .16 
    Civilians wounded 44 .25 37 1.57 19 .53 
    Terrorists  
       killed/wounded 
44 .11 37 .30 19 .05 
    Arrest Made 44 .27* 37 .31
†
 19 .58 
    Number of Arrests 44 .66* 37 .83 19 1.95 
Public Response       
   Extra Security 44 .41 37 .30 19 .32 
   Public Fear 44 .23 37 .32 19 .37 
   Policy Change 44 .16 37 .16 19 .16 
Description of Claim       
   Specific Demand 44 .39 -- -- 7 .43 
   Retaliation 44 .43 -- -- 7 .43 
   Future Attacks 44 .41 -- -- 7 .43 
†
 t-test shows significant difference from miscoded cases, p<.10 






Table B.1: Effects of Miscoding Claimed and Unclaimed Terrorist Attacks Given 
Positive or Negative Relationship with Specific Targets 
 
  Original Claim Status 
 Claimed Unclaimed 
Claimed Correct 
If Specific Target increases 
P(claim): this mistake would 
exaggerate the relationship 
 
If Specific Target  
decreases P(claim):  this 
mistake would bias the 





If Specific Target increases 
P(claim): this mistake would 
bias the results toward 0 
 
If Specific Target decreases 
P(claim):  this mistake 

























Note: For simplicity, the relationships are demonstrated as if the independent variable and dependent 
variable are continuous, not dichotomous 
Figure B.1: Effect of Miscoding Claim Status when Positive Relationship 
























(biased to 0) 
Figure B.2: Effect of Miscoding Claim Status when Negative Relationship 
between Specific Target and Claims for Attacks 
Note: For simplicity, the relationships are demonstrated as if the independent variable and dependent 
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